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The Development Of Competition Law
In Vietnam In The Face Of Economic
Reforms And Global Integration

Alice Pham *
I. INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have seen Vietnam, along with several other
economies once committed to centralized economic planning, make great
efforts to move towards a more market-based economy. Once known
mostly for interacting with countries of the same political and ideological
commitments, Vietnam now has come a long way from being a completely
closed economy towards proactively integrating into various regional and
world economies. Together with this process, Vietnam has undergone a
massive legislative transformation, the focus of which is to replace the
traditional use of administrative directives and government orders in
economic regulation with a regulatory system based on universally
applicable legislative norms and macroeconomic principles. Vietnam has
since achieved record economic growth,' drawing a great deal of attention
and interest from the international arena.
Achievements notwithstanding, one cannot deny that in recent years
the pace of Vietnam's transformation has slowed down at times, and there
are threats and challenges, both old and new, with which Vietnam must deal
in order to continue its path of development. One such challenge that is as
old as the reform process itself is the dilemma between political ideology
and economic policy. This dilemma has led to the development of a
"bifurcated regulatory system, ' , 2 a very unique characteristic of Vietnam
* The author is Researcher with the Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS International),
Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation (C-CIER), and Coordinator of
the "Advocacy and Capacity Building on Competition Policy and Law in Asia" Project, on
which this article is substantially based.
1 See The Ministry of Finance of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam Records
GDP Growth of 8.4 per cent in 2005 (Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.mof.gov.vn/
DefaultE.aspx? tabid 356&tem1D=29970.
2 This term was first used in Vietnam: Legal and JudicialDevelopment 16 (AusAID [The
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which is designed to accommodate the rising demands of a market economy
and at the same time ensure socialist ideology and overall state control.
The challenge is increasing, especially as Vietnam heads into a more
for its
advanced stage of economic reform and integration, and strives
3
pending accession into the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
An effective competition law, as is now widely recognized, is a
concomitant requirement for market-based reforms. Such a law aims at
limiting unnecessary interventions or abuses of power in the marketplace by
the State or by private sector enterprises that adversely affect economic
efficiency and consumer welfare. Moreover, an effective competition law
enables the government to keep a check on the concentration of economic
power and rent-seeking behavior. It strengthens economic democracy and
social cohesion by providing market participation opportunities through the
prevention of anti-competitive practices by dominant firms, and lowers the
barriers to entry faced by individual entrepreneurs, and small and mediumsized businesses.
Beneficial as it may seem, a competition law will be of no use or will
have a very small role in a state-run economy if market functions are
displaced by government mandates. Furthermore, in a developing economy
the possible role of competition law is even more difficult to determine. As
put forth by Jean-Jacques Laffont:
Competition is unambiguously a good thing in the first-best world of
economists. That world assumes large numbers of participants in all
markets, no public goods, no externalities, no information asymmetries,
complete markets, no natural monopolies or, more generally, convexity
of technologies in addition to full rationality of economic agents, a
benevolent court system to enforce contracts, and a benevolent
government with lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable
redistribution. Developing economies are of course very far from this
ideal world, and the policy question 'Should competition be encouraged
in developing countries?' must be raised in a more realistic framework.4
Unfortunately, Vietnam has both the above-mentioned attributes of

such a developing economy and those of a transitional one. In Vietnam,
government regulations still assume a special significance, and public
Austl. Gov't's Overseas Aid Program], Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/vietnam-wp3.pdf.
3 See, e.g., International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Vietnam's
Accession Progresses; Civil Society Concerns Raised, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS
DIGEST,

December 22, 2004, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-12-22/story3.html;

WTO

Accession in the Sprint, VIETNAMNET BRIDGE, Jan. 1, 2005, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/

files/2005/01/368424/.
4 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, COMPETITION INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT

ed., 1998).

(World Bank
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policies and cultural perceptions reflect a clear preference for statistical
solutions to economic problems.
This article examines the development of a competition regime in
Vietnam, with all of the existing difficulties and problems. In the context of
this socialist country, we examine the economic reform and integration
process and the challenges of liberalization and globalization. Finally, we
provide some thoughts for the future. Specifically, Section II addresses the
emergence of Vietnam's competition law since the 1980's. Section III
describes some of the key legal provisions of the Competition Law of
Vietnam. Section IV evaluates the current challenges in the implementation
of the Vietnam competition regime, while Section V proposes some
recommendations.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF VIETNAM'S COMPETITION LAW SINCE
THE 1980'S
More than one hundred countries around the globe have now adopted
competition laws, of which approximately two-thirds are less-developed
and/or transitional economies; many other countries are in the process of
adopting competition laws.
The proliferation of competition laws is
undoubtedly linked to the wave of neo-liberal economic reforms introduced
since the 1980's and, in particular, to the issues raised as a result of
privatization.6 It is also part of the broader proliferation of liberal
democracies and market-oriented economics becoming the dominant
ideological models in the wake of the collapse of the communist bloc.7
Other motivating factors include the recent global waves of mega-mergers,
the increased potential for cross-border anti-competitive practices, the
ascendancy of economic integration with the WTO, and lastly the radical
shift in the policy of international institutions that now encourage and
emphasize the adoption of competition law in developing countries and
endorse its vital role in the process of development.
The emergence of a competition law in Vietnam is set in a localized
picture of all of the above factors combined. Vietnam remains a socialist
country with a single ruling party, the Communist Party of Vietnam
("CPV"). In the 1980's, the government recognized the roots of economic
stagnation and crises in the rigid, centrally-planned, command-and-control
economic system, which only favored loss-making, monopolistic, stateowned enterprises ("SOEs"). The CPV has since shown a strong
5 CUTS International, Introductory Chapter: Promoting A Healthy Competition Culture
Around the World, in COMPETITION REGIMES IN THE WORLD--A CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT iv,

xii-xv (Pradeep S. Mehta ed., 2006) [hereinafter CUTS International].
6 Paul Cook, Competition Policy, Market Power and Collusion in Developing Countries,
in LEADING ISSUES INCOMPETITION, REGULATION AND DEV. (Paul Cook et al. eds., 2004).

7 Id.

549
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inclination towards neo-liberal economic reforms, which resulted in the Doi
Moi ("Change" and "Newness" by literal meaning) policy in 1986.8 This
policy recognized the private sector as potentially more efficient suppliers
of goods and services, and as the new engine of growth. It also gave way to
the dissolution, restructuring, and privatization (called "equitization" in
Vietnam) process of many formerly State-owned monopolies, liberalized
both internal and external trade regimes, and encouraged private (both
domestic and foreign) investment in the economy. The significance of
competitive markets was upheld in several CPV documents and socioeconomic development strategies of Vietnam. 9 With this new thinking in
mind, the Vietnamese government ("GOV") started building the blocks for
market development and setting the rules of the game for investors and
enterprises.
It was, nevertheless, nearly ten years later, in the late 1990's, that talk
about introducing a competition law in Vietnam started circulating within
the academic circles, think-tanks, and state agencies. Facilitated by the
technical assistance efforts of international institutions like the United
Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"), the World Bank ("WB"), and
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), it was recognized that after many
years of reforms, there remained several flaws in the regulatory
infrastructure system for commercial activities and there was severe
discrimination between the state and private sector.10 A level playing field
was not properly established and abuse of economic and administrative
power by SOEs was still prevalent. In additional, the opening of the
economy, as well as its integration into the regional markets and the world,
8 See, e.g., Kheang Un, Vietnam at the Crossroads: The Modern PoliticalEconomy,

http://niu.edu/ceas/outreach/vietnam2.html;

Pietro P. Masina, Vietnamese Development

Strategies Between Tradition and Modernity, REPORT No. 4/1999, FEDERICO CAFFt CENTRE

RESEARCH REPORTS, http://www.ruc.dk/federico/publications/Masina_4_99.pdf; Michael
Alexandros, Where is Vietnam Heading?, LINKS INT'L J. OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL (Dec.
2002), availableat http://www.dsp.org.au/links/back/issue22/ Alexandros.htm.
9 See, e.g., Political Report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Vietnam at the 8th National Congress in 1996, § 3 (Bao cao Chinh tri cua Ban Chap hanh
Trung uong Dang, Dai hoi Dang lan thu 8), available at http://www.cpv.org.vn/details.asp?

topic=2&subtopic=4&leader topic=225&id=BT1260353556 [hereinafter Report to the 8th
Congress]; The Resolution of the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam
in 2001, § 4 (Nghi quyet Dai hoi Dai bieu Toan quoc Ian thu 9 Dang Cong San Viet Nam),

available
at
www.cpv.org.vn/details.asp?topic=2&subtopic=4&leader topic=226&
id=BT1370336607; The Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 2001-2010, § 4 (Chien
luoc Phat trien Kinh te Xa hoi 2010-2010), available at http://www.cpv.org.vn/

details.asp?topic=2&subtopic=4&leaderjtopic=226&id=BT 1370335562.
1oSee, e.g., Central Institute for Economic Management, Some Legal and Institutional
Issues Regarding Competition Policy and Control of Economic Monopolies (2002)
(unpublished report produced within the framework of the UNDP-supported project
VIE/97/016 [Completing the Enabling Business Environment in Vietnam], on file with the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
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There emerged the problem of power
had posed new challenges.
between
foreign
companies, most often transnational
asymmetry
corporations ("TNCs") and domestic enterprises, as well as problems
arising from domestic and cross-border anti-competitive practices. All of
these factors, coupled with Vietnam's aspirations to join the WTO and its
advances into deeper economic reforms, induced the GOV to consider the
adoption of a competition law for the country.
Subsequently, the CPV, at its Eighth National Congress, stated the
need to
establish cooperation and a healthy competitive environment in
production and trade; develop state-owned monopolies in some certain
industries and sectors of strategic significance to the country; eliminate
monopolies in other commercial activities, and prevent abuses of
monopolistic positions aimed at maintaining privileges, individual
benefits and distorting competition in the market.'
Thus, the need to adopt a law that safeguards competition in the new market
economy was necessary. Henceforth, with the encouragement and technical
support of the UNDP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"), the Vietnamese Ministry of Trade was
assigned the task of drafting a law on competition for Vietnam, which was
finally adopted in 2004.12
III. THE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Passed in December 2004 by the National Assembly of Vietnam, the
Competition Law of Vietnam ("Competition Law") is a result of a four-year
drafting process. It references to the statutes of nine nation-states and
territories and the model laws promoted by international institutions like the
UNCTAD and the WB, and is influenced by the enforcement practices and
experiences of other countries as well. 13 It became effective on July 1,
2005.14

The Competition Law applies to all business enterprises and
11Report to 8th Congress, supra note 9.
12

United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") Vietnam, Project VIE/01/002

[Institutional and Capacity Building in the Area of Competition Law and Policy in Vietnam]
(with technical assistance from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)), http://www.undp.org.vn/undp/prog/profile/eng/gov/vie0 1002.htm.
13 See,
e.g., Tran Anh Son, The Progress of Drafting Competition Law,
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgram2003/TranAnh.pdf (last visited March
18, 2006); Le Danh Vinh, Building Competition Law in Vietnam to Meet the Need of
Regulating Market Economy and in the Light of Trade Liberalization and International
Economic Integration (2003), http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/01/vietnam p.pdf.
14 Competition Law 2005, No. 27/2004/QH1 1 (Vietnam) [hereinafter Competition Law].
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professional and trade associations in Vietnam, overseas enterprises and
associations registered in Vietnam, public utilities and state monopoly
enterprises, and state administrative bodies.1 5 It has supremacy over all
other enacted laws of16Vietnam regarding restrictive business practices and
unfair trade practices.
The Competition Law prohibits five broad types of anti-competitive
practices: (1) competition restriction agreements; 17 (2) abuse of dominant or
monopoly position;' 8 (3) "concentrations of economic power" that
substantially restrict competition; 19 (4) acts of unhealthy competition;20 and
(5) anti-competitive behaviors/decisions by officials or State administrative
agencies taking advantage of their authority.2 The Competition Law also
sets certain competition procedures for complaints and investigations of
alleged abuses.22
A. Regulation of Competition Restriction Agreements
Article 9 of the Competition Law prohibits per se bid-rigging
agreements, agreements that prevent or restrain other enterprises from
entering the market, and agreements that banish other enterprises from the
market.23 It also prohibits agreements on price-fixing, distribution outlets,
restricting production quantities, and imposing restrictive conditions on
other enterprises or forcing them to accept obligations having no direct
connection with the subject of the contracts when the parties to the
agreements have a combined market share of 30% or more on the relevant
market.24 When violations are found, monetary fines of up to 10% of the
total revenue in the financial year preceding the year in which the violative
act is committed for each of the parties to the agreement will be imposed.25
Other forms of penalization and remedial measures include confiscation of
all of the profits gained as a result of the violating acts and compulsory
preclusion of terms in violation of the provisions of law from the contract or
business transactions.26

"sId. at art. 2.
16

Id. at art. 5.

'7

Id. at art. 9.

22

Id. at ch. V, arts. 56-121.

18Id. at arts. 13, 14.
'9Id. at arts. 16-24.
20 Competition Law, arts. 39-48.
21 Id. at art. 6.
23 Id. § 1, art. 9.

24 Id. § 2, art. 9.
25 Id. at art. 118.

26 See Decree No. 120/2005/ND-CP on Handling Violations of the Laws Concerning
Competition,http://www.mot.gov.vn/mot/LawsData/120.2005.ND-CP.pdf.
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Enterprises, however, may apply for an exemption if the agreement (i)
rationalizes an organizational structure or business scale and increases
efficiency, (ii) promotes technical or technological progress, improving the
quality of goods and service, (iii) promotes uniform applicability of quality
standards and technical norms of certain types of products, (iv) unifies
conditions on trading, delivery of goods and payments but not those relating
to price or any pricing factors, (v) increases the competitiveness of small
and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs"), or (vi) increases the
competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises in the international market.27
Exemptions may be granted only for a finite duration.28
The market share threshold of 30% and the block exemption provided
in the Competition Law, however, need to be enforced properly. Otherwise
they will simply become means by which enterprises can abuse and escape
the scrutiny of the law, especially in the context of the restrictive
agreements that have been rampant in the Vietnamese market recently,
under increasingly sophisticated forms. Exclusionary, foreclosure, and bidrigging agreements, prohibited per se by the Competition Law, create a
great deal of harm to enterprise and market development, adversely impact
state revenues, and especially deprive the consumers of fair deals, better
choices and quality, and reduced prices.2 9
For example, a new beer product was foreclosed from the domestic
market due to unjust pressure exercised by a coalition of established beer
producers in retail shops, distribution agencies and bars. 30 The product at
issue was Laser beer, the first Vietnamese brand of bottled draft beer. The
competitors, Heineken, Tiger and Bivina (a product produced by the
Vietnam Beer Joint-Venture), reportedly forced distribution agencies, retail
shops, and bars to sign exclusive contracts with them. The contracts
prevented these sellers and distributors from selling, exhibiting,
introducing, marketing, or even allowing marketing staff of any other beer
brands to work on their business premises. As compensation, these shops
and distributors would receive a "sponsor" amount between VND 50
million ($3174) and VND 100 million ($6349) per annum. 3' This strategy
enabled these beer brands to effectively prevent any promotional campaigns
27

Competition Law, supra note 14, at point a-f, § 1, art. 10.

2I ld. § 1, art 10.
29 CUTS & CIEM, Competition Scenario in Vietnam, (forthcoming in May 2006) (report

produced within the framework of the Advocacy and Capacity Building on Competition
Policy and Law in Asia, on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business) [hereinafter Competition Scenario].
30 See CUTS & CIEM, E-Newsletter-Vol 1: Promotional Strategy Foreclosed New
Entrant, http://www.cuts-international.org/E-NewsletterVoll.htm#pro (for a summary based
on stories reported by VIETNAMNET on May 18, 2004 and July 4, 2004).
31 Vietnam Dong. US $1 is equal to approximately VND 15,800 at the current exchange
rate.
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of Laser anywhere in Vietnam, from metropolitan cities to provincial areas.
A beer shop owner was even brought to court by the Vietnam Beer Joint
Venture for having violated the contract by selling Laser beer which,
according to the shop owner, had been repeatedly demanded by the
customer. The court ruled in favor of the beer producers, since the
Competition Law had yet to be passed.
Many other examples of outrageous anti-competitive behavior can be
seen in construction projects funded by the state budget in Vietnam. One
such example was the Van Lam-Son Hai II Road Construction Project.3 2
Four companies participated in the bidding for this project and "Company
98" was awarded the contract. It was later discovered that all four
participants belonged to the same business group, which Company 98
controlled.3 3 Company 98 had arranged for three shell companies to submit
bids at inflated prices in order to create the illusion of a competitive
process. Having made these arrangements in advance, Company 98 was
ensured, and indeed was awarded, the contract at a price within ten
millionths of a percent of the published government estimates (VND 141
difference on a VND 1.56B contract).34 Clearly, the government's plan to

reduce construction costs by selecting the lowest bid failed.
B. Control of Abuses of Dominance and Monopoly
According to the Competition Law, a dominant market position
applies to firms holding at least a 30% market share or firms that are
"capable of substantially restricting competition. 3 5 The Competition Law
also provides for a collective market dominant position for firms having a
total market share of the relevant market of 50% for two business entities,
65% for three, and 75% for four.3 6 Dominant firms are prohibited from
selling goods below cost to restrict a competitor, fixing an unreasonable
selling or purchase price, restricting production, distribution, markets or
technical development in ways that harm consumers, applying dissimilar
commercial conditions to different firms for the same transaction, imposing
conditions on other firms in sale-purchase contracts or imposing conditions
unrelated to the transaction, preventing market entry by new competitors,
and engaging
in "other practices" in restraint of competition as stipulated by
37
law.

A monopoly market position would apply to a firm if it has no

32 Competition Scenario, supra note 29.
33Id.

34Id.

35Competition Law, supra note 14, § 1, art. 11.
36
1Id. § 2, art. 11.

" Id. at art. 13.
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competitors for the goods it trades or for the services it provides.3 8
Monopoly firms are prevented from undertaking any of the activities listed
in the previous paragraph pertaining to dominant firms, as well as imposing
disadvantageous conditions on consumers, and unilaterally rescinding or
replacing a contract for plausible reasons.39 A unique provision of the
Competition Law regulates the state-monopolized sectors. The government
will continue to control those sectors by deciding the prices, quantities,
volumes, and market scope.4 °
As mentioned in the introduction, liberalization and deregulation
versus keeping the dominant role in communist political ideology is at the
core of the dilemma that Vietnam faces during its economic reform process.
This explains the above bifurcation between the control of abuses of
dominance and monopolies and the maintenance of State control over key
sectors of the economy in the Competition Law. The paradox is that most of
these state-monopolized sectors are large-scale network industries
producing public utility products/services, such as telecommunications,
electricity, water, and transportation. The threat of abuse would rise when
these public monopolies are simply transformed into private ones since not
all are so-called natural monopolies. In another scenario, the de facto
position of these dominant or monopolistic SOEs may put them outside the
reach of the Competition Law, annulling the power of the enforcement
agencies. The problems will be aggravated when enforcement agencies are
not completely free from political will or administrative hierarchy, or are
not equipped with sufficient knowledge, skills and resources, which is the
case in Vietnam.
1. The Telecommunications Market as an IllustrativeExample
The telecommunications market, for example, will be one source of
enforcement headaches for the competition authority due to its complexities
and the conflicts between state interests and unleashed competition from the
private sector. Before 1995 the state-owned Vietnam Post and
Telecommunications Corporation ("VNPT") was the only network and
fixed-line telephone operator in Vietnam. There were only three mobile
networks in operation in Vietnam during that time and all of them belonged
to VNPT: Vinaphone, Mobiphone, and Call-link. As of the end of 2003,
there were two enterprises providing fixed-line services: VNPT and Saigon
Postel Co. ("SPT").
There were three other mobile phone services
providers: Viettel, an army-run company, was allowed to build and operate
its mobile network in 1998 and actually started its network in October of

38 Id. at art. 12.
40

I §§ 2-3, art. 14.
Id.
Id. at art. 15.
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2004; SPT, introduced the S-Fone network in July 2003; and Hanoi Post
launched the Cityphone network in Hanoi in December 2002 and expanded
to Ho Chi Minh City in 2003. In effect, competition has been infused into
the market for a few years now, though VNPT remains the dominant player
in both fixed-line and mobile services. By the end of 2004, VNPT had
nearly 3.4 million fixed-line subscribers and SPT only 24,000 subscribers.
In contrast, Mobifone and Vinaphone dominated the mobile services market
with approximately 2.2 million and 2.5 million subscriber respectively,
while there were only about 150,000 and 100,000 subscribers for S-Fone
and Viettel respectively. 4'
More quality services are available and prices have been reduced
substantially as a result of the liberalization process, due to the benefits of
competition. Concerns about anti-competitive behaviors of market players,
however, have arisen. For example, SPT and Viettel have repeatedly
complained about VNPT for abusing its market power and for using its
"patronage-client" relationship with the Ministry of Post and Telematics
("MPT") to maintain its market dominance. The incumbent service
provider was said to cause difficulties for SPT and Viettel by not providing
sufficient interconnection to its network and by quoting technological or
capacity constraints to refrain from providing interconnection in a timely
manner. Such behavior not only arises from an anti-competitive refusal to
deal, in contravention of the Competition Law's prohibition of enterprises
with dominant market share, but also contradicts the mandatory obligation
to provide interconnection as required by the telecommunication sectoral
regulation.4 2 As these two young service providers were trying their best to
build their market share, which had been dominated by VNPT, they
resorted to measures such as unreasonably excessive promotions, or selling
below costs, a behavior also prohibited by the Competition Law if an
enterprise holds a dominant market position.4 3 Resolving such cases would
certainly be difficult for the competition authority in light of the bifurcated
provisions in the Competition Law itself.
C. Regulation of Economic Concentration Between Enterprises
Economic concentration activities are defined as any conduct by a firm
that aims to govern the activities of other enterprises including, but not
41 See Competition Scenario, supra note 29 (for a description of the situation pre- and
post-Doi Moi in the telecommunication sector in Vietnam.).
42 See CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment, & Economic Regulation, E-Newsletter
Vol. 1, http://www.cuts-intemational.org/E-NewsletterVoll.htm#do;
CUTS Centre for
Competition, Investment, & Economic Regulation, E-Newsletter Vol.-V, http://www.cutsintemational.org/7up2/7Up2E-newsV-full.htm.
43 See, e.g., CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment, & Economic Regulation, ENewsletter Vol. VII, http://www.cuts-international.org/7up2/7up2E-newsVII-full.htm.
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limited to, mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and joint ventures that have
this aim. All concentration cases in which the combined market share of
the relevant firms would be 50% or more are prohibited except where: (1)
the result is still a small or medium-sized enterprise (a concept not defined
in the law), 4 (2) one of the parties is at risk of being dissolved or bankrupt,
or (3) the economic concentration has the effect of expanding exports or
contributing to socio-economic development and technological advance.4 5
A 30-day notification to the competition authorities is mandatory where the
participating parties would have a combined market share of 30-50%.
Divestiture measures are provided,
but only as an ex post remedy for
46
unlawful concentration cases.
D. Prohibition of Unfair Competition Acts
With respect to acts of unhealthy competition, the Competition Law
prohibits falsification of commercial instructions, infringement of business
secrets, acts of bribery, inducement or coercion, defamation of other
enterprises, disrupting the lawful business practices of other firms,
advertisements and promotions aimed at unhealthy competition,
discrimination within or by an industry association, and illegal multi-level
("pyramid") selling of goods.
E. Organization of the Competition Authorities
The enforcement authorities provided for by the Competition Law are
the Competition Administration Agency and the Competition Council. The
Competition Administration Agency is to be established under the purview
of the Ministry of Trade and performs the regulation of economic
concentration and investigations into competition cases, as well as resolving
cases involving unfair competition acts only. The head of the Competition
Administration Agency is appointed by the Prime Minister at the proposal
of the Trade Minister, 7 while the investigators are appointed by the Trade
Minister at the proposal of the head of the Agency. 8 The Competition
Council consists of eleven to fifteen members serving a five-year term who
are appointed (and may be reappointed) by the Prime Minister at the
proposal of the Trade Minister. 49 The Council hears and resolves
competition cases other than those related to unfair competition acts. After
the Competition Administration Agency has conducted preliminary and

44
45

Competition Law, supra note 14, at art. 18.

Id. at art. 19.
"Id. at art. 117.
41 Id. at art. 50.

" Id. at art. 51.
'9 Id. at art. 53.
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official investigations into a competition case, the chairperson of the
Council will select five members to set up a Competition Case-Handling
Council which will hold a hearing. This ad hoc Council rules on the
evidence produced by the investigation and submitted by the affected
parties, as well as any expert opinions it or the parties solicit.
F. Competition Procedures for Complaints and Investigations
The Competition Law also stipulates detailed rules and procedures
governing complaints, investigations, interim orders by the competition
authorities, consideration of alleged abuses, and penalties thereof. Either an
affected party or the Competition Administration Agency can initiate
complaints or actions against violative conduct. Where the Agency
determines that it has jurisdiction over an external complaint within seven
days from receipt of a complaint, it must begin an investigation.
If a breach of the law is found, warnings, fines and other additional
sanctions (such as revocation of the business registration certificates, and
remedial measures such as the restructuring of the enterprise holding the
dominant position, the division of the merged enterprises, or the removal of
illegal provisions from the contract) may also be imposed.5 ° In the event
that state officials or government employees have breached the law, they
may be disciplined or criminally punished and may be subject to civil
liability for damages.5 1
Any party who disagrees with the decisions of the Competition CaseHandling Council may file a complaint with the Competition Council. In
contrast, one who disagrees with the decisions of the head of the
Competition Administration Agency may file a complaint with the Trade
Minister. 52 Again, the party who disagrees with the decision to settle
complaints about the decisions may file an administrative lawsuit with the
relevant provincial/municipal People's Courts, 53 whose rulings will be final.
IV. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIETNAM
COMPETITION REGIME
The current competition regime of Vietnam dates back to earlier than
the birth of the 2004 Competition Law itself. Prior to the passage of the
law, a Competition Administration Department had already been created
within the Ministry of Trade, by an order from the Trade Minister.54 This
Department was expected to be built into the Competition Administration
50 Competition Law, supra note 14, at art. 117.
51 Id. at art. 120.
52
Id. at art. 107.
51 Id. at art. 115.
54 See Vietnam's Ministry of Trade Homepage, http://www.mot.gov.vn.
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Agency for Vietnam after the law was passed. The Department was
assigned by the Trade Minister to take charge of all issues related to
competition and initially to draft all the implementation guidelines for the
Competition Law,55 consumer protection, and trade remedy measures. This
is a somewhat strange development in the competition regime of Vietnam
since in most other countries the competition authority is usually set up to
implement the law after the law on competition has been adopted. In the
case of Vietnam, as mentioned above, even when the competition law was
still being drafted and there was no legal framework for the establishment
of a competition authority, the authority was already there. This reverse
development course of the Vietnam competition regime had its origin
within the content of the Competition Law itself, although only a draft at
the time, and the specific political economy of Vietnam.
The initial drafts of the Competition Law provided for the
establishment of the Competition Administration Agency within the
Ministry of Trade. However, when put forward for national consultation
and comments, this idea faced great opposition from all other government
agencies, research circles, and the wider public, similar to when the draft
law was put forward for debates in the National Assembly. The agency's
placement within the Ministry of Trade was perceived to handicap the
independence of the future agency, thus affecting this agency's
specialization, fairness, transparency, and accountability; which had been
considered as the main causes leading to the ineffectiveness of competition
law enforcement in several countries. It was also thought that locating the
future competition agency within the Ministry of Trade would mean
subjugating this agency's power in disciplining the conducts of giant SOEs
in Vietnam, which are owned by different line ministries and have powerful
relationships within the government. Furthermore, the Ministry of Trade
itself at that time, held the ownership and control of several SOEs, leading
to public skepticism that they would be "at the same time both the players
on the ground and the referee" if they were to be given the power over
competition issues.56 Favoritism was thought to be inevitable in such a
scenario.
The Ministry of Trade and their advocates convinced the National

Three implementation regulations have subsequently been passed, namely (i) the
Decree making detailed provisions for implementation of the Competition Law, (ii) the
Decree on Administrative Offences in the Field of Competition, and (iii) the Decree on
Illegal Multi-level Marketing Schemes. A Decree on the Organization of the Competition
Administration Agency and the Competition Council is still pending, and thereupon pending
the official decree of the legal status of the Competition Administration Department
mentioned above, as well as the establishment of the Competition Council.
56 See Thanh Nian, Competition Regulation: Not to be at the Same Time the Players on
the Ground and the Referee (2004), available at http://www3.thanhnien.com.vn/xahoi/
2005/4/4/65444.tno.
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Assembly that the proposal was meant to be in line with the ongoing
administrative reforms in Vietnam. They argued that: (1) the creation of
another ministerial-level state agency was undesirably cumbersome and
wasteful; (2) that the Ministry was the only agency at that time that had
some expertise on competition issues, being the lead agency of the law
drafting committee; and (3) that many other countries were effective in their
placement of their competition agency within a Ministry. The opponents of
such a placement eventually lost the battle. However, they were certain that
the early establishment of the Competition Administration Department
within the Trade Ministry had been a Machiavellian step, which contributed
significantly to the success of the Ministry in getting control over
competition issues into their own hands and not into the hands of any other
new state agencies.
The triumph of the Ministry of Trade over the Competition Law in
Vietnam also has another political significance. As mentioned earlier, the
dilemma of the reform process in Vietnam was to balance the development
of a market economy with the rigidities of communist ideology and State
control. The adoption of the Competition Law is expected to provide an
important tool to ensure a level playing field for all enterprises to compete
fairly, to avoid concentration of power, oligarchy, monopoly, corruption
and other distortions that may arise in a market economy. However, the
government in Vietnam still wants to retain control over the economy at the
end of the day, not just as a facilitator who creates the ground but as a
player as well. This essentially means restraining the power of the
competition authorities within the realm of administrative fiats.
Subjugating control over competition issues in the Trade Ministry would
very conveniently serve this end.
Despite the expertise of the Ministry of Trade and its enthusiasm to
take over the implementation task for the Competition Law, the
Government Decree on the Organization of the Competition Administration
Agency and the Competition Council is not yet issued and therefore no
enforcement activities have been undertaken so far.57 The Competition
Administration Department still restricts itself mainly to advocacy,
networking, training, and information dissemination. The developments of
the market, in the meantime, do not wait for anybody, and the complexity
of enterprises' competitive behaviors in Vietnam has greatly matured. The
incidences of anti-competitive practices and unfair competition practices are
increasing and being reported over and over again, discrediting the
regulatory role of the government against market participants, affecting
enterprise development and economic efficiency, and ultimately, harming
the consumer's welfare and interest.

57 Id.
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V. CHALLENGES TO COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
VIETNAM AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementation of a competition law, however, is not a problem
pertaining only to Vietnam. Enforcement records have been generally low
in most developing countries for the same set of reasons, such as political
economy constraints, corruption, skepticism, apathy, business opposition,
and policy inertia.
De jure ministerial override of the competition authority's power
exists in many countries' regimes, such as in Kenya, Pakistan, and
Argentina.59 These can be absolute or partial. For example, under German
law, although rarely used, the Minister can veto the competition authority's
decisions in merger cases, except in cases where national interests are
involved (such as the international competitiveness of an important
industry, or other public interest issues).6 ° In developing countries like
Vietnam, even if the competition law does not subjugate the power of the
competition authority to that of a particular ministry, ministers can exercise
defacto powers to influence the competition authority's decisions.61 In the
case of Vietnam, the traditionally heavy state intervention into the
operations of the market, and the insistence of the ruling party on
maintaining communist ideological control over the economy, might
exacerbate the problem.
SOEs' enterprises may prove difficult to discipline, since they can rely
on the patronage of the line ministries,62 whereas provincial authorities have
always shown strong inclination to favor industries and enterprises based in
their jurisdiction, which may amount to local monopolies beyond the reach
of the competition agencies. All of these factors may defeat the ultimate
objective of the law or the case decisions. Independence of the competition
authorities is crucial to the success of competition law enforcement. This
may not happen immediately, due to reasons we have repeatedly touched
upon earlier in this paper, but may develop gradually, such as in the case of
other countries. Institutional building, however, should be stressed starting
at the foundation stage, beginning with the most fundamental elements,
58 See, e.g., Josef Drexl, InternationalCompetition Law-A Missing Link between TRIPS
and Transfer of Technology, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO)
at
http://www.wipo.org/documents/en/meetings/2003/wipowto/
(2003),
available
presentations/doc/drexI.doc.
59 CUTS International, supra note 5.
60

Id.

61 Id.

62 The concept of 'line ministries' is often used in command-and-control, developing or
transition economies to refer to ministries which are assigned to take charge of all issues
related to a particular sector or industry within an economy, from industrial policy to
regulatory functions, and sometimes planning and development of the incumbent SOEs or
monopolies, etc. in that industry/sector.
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such as manpower and budget, and ranging to development of the
international organizational structure and enhancing the relationship with
other relevant state agencies, as well as the judiciary.
The approach of graduality also applies to the implementation process
of the law itself, which has been the experience of several other countries.
The Fair Trade Commission of Korea, the first new industrialized economy
to have successfully disciplined giant transnational corporations ("TNCs")
and international hard-core cartels, initially dedicated several of its
founding years to advocacy and played the role of awareness-raiser and
advisor to the private sector, before the Korean competition regime gained
its current power and credibility. Many other countries, such as the United
Kingdom, India and Taiwan, have also used the same method, based on a
simple idea inspired by R. Shyam Khemani and Mark A. Dutz63 and Gesner
Oliveira. 64 Given the low awareness and the remaining skepticism of
society on the relevance of competition law in Vietnam, as well as its
limited resources, the competition authorities should start by familiarizing
the public with the law, and focusing on the actions that would most likely
succeed and will benefit the market, as well as other confidence-building
and support-mobilizing measures. Gradually, they can take up more
complicated cases, or target more powerful adversaries, when they are more
mature in terms of capacity and have more resources and public support.
Capacity building and competition advocacy should also be focused
towards the consumer movement, the business community, or sectoral
regulators to the best extent possible in the process. Rigorous competition
enforcement and success only come at a later phase.
Last but not least, as Vietnam undergoes a deeper level of reform and
more fully integrates into the region and the world economy, cross-border
issues in competition law will become inevitable. International cooperation
on competition law enforcement will become more important. With the
opening up and integration of the Vietnamese economy, consumers may
easily be harmed by the anti-competitive behaviors of a company doing
business outside the country's jurisdiction. For companies, this means they
will have to compete in a wider market and will be faced with more
rigorous competitive pressures. As a result, even young competition
authorities like those of Vietnam may have to deal with cases of
international cartels or large-scale, cross-border mergers. International
cooperation with other competition authorities is inevitably required to
effectively investigate conduct that restrains competition regionally or
63 R. Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and their
Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995).
64 Gesner Oliveira, International Cooperation and Competition Policy, in CUTS,
PUTTING OUR FEARS ON THE TABLE (2003).
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globally. Technical and legal assistance, and the exchange of information
with more advanced competition authorities are also essential in this regard.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many countries have adopted competition laws but have never quite
managed to successfully enforce them: Thailand enacted its first law in
1979, which was never implemented and the enforcement records of the
new law promulgated in 1999 were extremely poor; Egypt took almost a
decade to enact a competition law since the first draft in 1995,65 and even
after adoption, there was no certainty that the law could be implemented
effectively. More or less similar situations can be found in countries like
Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Malawi.66 However, this is not to say
that the challenges for Vietnam should be insurmountable. In all countries
with long traditions in implementing competition laws, the process has been
very dynamic. Laws have been substantially amended or scrapped and new
ones have been adopted to meet the current needs and the new political
economy of the country. Thus, a long-term, dynamic vision should be
adopted for Vietnam vis-A-vis the implementation of this new Competition
Law.
As stated by the economic Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, "strong
competition policy is not just a luxury to be enjoyed by rich countries, but a
real necessity for those striving to create democratic market economies. 67
The development of competition law in Vietnam should not be a goal in
itself, the law should not become just a decorative tool, and its enforcement
should aim to bring about increased economic efficiency and improved
public welfare. From this perspective, competition law enforcement is in
line with Vietnam's ideological aspiration towards "an affluent people, a
strong State, and a fair and civilized society," 68 and its significance should
not be categorized as a capitalistic Trojan horse.

65 Law on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices,
No. 3/2005 (Egypt).
66 CUTS International, supra note 5.
67 Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Competing Over Competition Policy (Aug. 2001),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz5 (italics added).
68 VIETNAM CONSTITUTION, art. 3.
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